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1 Introduction
Policy reforms aimed at reducing the distortionary effects of the tax and transfer system often focus
on improving labor supply incentives for low-income households. Recently, a number of studies
have argued that redistribution to the working poor as achieved, e.g., via the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) in the US can substantially improve welfare of this group without imposing a large
cost on tax payers (e.g. Immervoll et al. 2007; Blundell et al. 2016). However, individuals with
low income often face labor market constraints and cannot adjust their hours of work at will. Ev-
idence that workers cannot choose their hours of work freely has been found for several countries
including Germany.1 Restrictions to the set of work hours available to employees may occur due
to employers offering specific jobs only in combination with specific work hours. Moreover, a
substantial share of the unemployed are involuntarily unemployed and cannot take up work when
incentives improve (see Subsection 2.1 and, e.g, Bargain et al. 2010 for evidence for Germany).
On the other hand, labor market constraints might even further reduce the costs of redistribution
via policy reforms if workers faced with increased marginal tax rates cannot reduce their hours
of work. Therefore, it is important to model these restrictions for the ex-ante evaluation of policy
reforms.
This paper makes three key contributions: First, we extend a standard discrete-choice labor
supply model by introducing involuntary unemployment and hours constraints. Second, we in-
corporate the constrained labor supply model in a microsimulation model and evaluate two hypo-
thetical tax-transfer reforms for Germany aimed at increasing labor supply incentives for low to
middle income households. The first simulated reform makes working at very low earning lev-
els unattractive, while increasing income at middle to high income levels. The second—more
conventional—reform redistributes from higher income earners to the lower middle class. Third,
we summarize the redistributive trade-off of the reforms in a simple policy measure, which mea-
sures the cost of redistributing one Euro via a specific reform.
We find that, first, labor supply elasticities under the constrained model are substantially smaller
than those estimated using a standard approach that does not allow for constraints. Second, the cost
of redistribution is substantially smaller via the first reform than via the second reform. The first
reform is desirable for low levels of inequality aversion, while the second dominates if inequality
aversion is larger.
1For the documentation of constrained hours of work see, e.g., Stewart and Swaffield (1997), Euwals (2001), Bryan
(2007), and Chetty et al. (2011) and for Germany Knaus and Otterbach (2019) and papers cited therein.
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We add to the literature on labor market constraints in structural labor supply models. (see, e.g.,
Blundell et al. 1987; Bingley and Walker 1997; Euwals and van Soest 1999; Bryan 2007; Bargain
et al. 2010; Beffy et al. 2019). Our approach makes use of a major advantage of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP): It contains information on both actual and desired hours of work.
Using both variables, we first estimate the probability to be constrained for specific numbers of
working hours. This includes modeling involuntary unemployment. In a second step, we estimate
a discrete choice labor supply model to obtain households’ utility functions using information on
desired hours of work and the actual budget constraint. The budget constraint is calculated using
the microsimulation model STSM. In a third step, we use information on constraints as well as the
estimated utility functions to predict labor supply responses.
Our approach differs from previous approaches to model involuntary unemployment and labor
market constraints in structural labor supply models. Many papers starting with van Soest (1995)
use information on actual hours of work to estimate a discrete choice model of labor supply and
include dummy variables for specific hours choices in the deterministic part of the utility func-
tion. This can be interpreted as an ad-hoc way to capture labor market frictions. An alternative
approach based on information on actual hours of work treats available hours categories as a latent
variable, see Aaberge et al. (1995) and Aaberge et al. (1999) for early applications and Dagsvik
et al. (2014) for an overview. In contrast, Bingley and Walker (1997), and Bargain et al. (2010) use
survey information on whether the unemployed are actively looking for a job. These papers model
only involuntary unemployment, but not other constraints in the choice of work hours. Using in-
formation on desired hours of work, Euwals and van Soest (1999) model restrictions for several
hours categories. However, the study is restricted to singles and for computational tractability it
is assumed that, if a given hours category is preferred, but not available, other hours categories
are ranked according to their distance to the preferred one. The approach proposed in this paper
does not impose this restriction. Another important difference between this study and previous
work is that we model involuntary unemployment and other labor market restrictions jointly.2 For
couple households, our approach assumes joint utility maximization and accounts for the com-
plementarity or substitutability of spouses’ leisure. In a recent paper, Mu¨ller et al. (2018) extend
the framework by Euwals and van Soest (1999) to couples and allow for unobservables to impact
constraint probabilities. An important distinction between that paper and our approach is that we
2Euwals and van Soest (1999) treat involuntary unemployment and constraints for specific positive hours choices
separately.
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derive an analytical solution for state probabilities.
Our study is related to the recent literature about efficiency increasing reforms of the tax and
transfer system. Typically, these studies focus on the working poor. In a recent study, Blundell
et al. (2016) find for the UK that increases in tax credit are a relatively cost-effective way to in-
crease welfare. Chan (2013) argues that a further EITC expansion results in substantial efficiency
gains, especially among low-wage individuals. Jessen et al. (2017a) show that—under standard as-
sumptions regarding the redistributive taste of the social planner—an optimal tax-transfer schedule
for singles in Germany would imply substantially higher net income for the working poor.
Finally, our study is related to papers that quantify the cost of redistribution via specific policy
reforms. If individuals work more as a consequence of a reform of the tax and transfer system,
the government needs to tax less than one Euro away from one group in order to redistribute one
Euro to another group. Therefore, policy reforms of the tax and transfer system often aim at
improving labor supply incentives. We use an approach based on Browning and Johnson (1984),
which measures the cost of redistribution as the decrease in disposable income for higher income
earners necessary to increase disposable income of lower income earners by one Euro.3 This
measure equals one in case of no labor supply reactions. Immervoll et al. (2007) quantify this
redistributive trade-off for two types of reforms. While their approach offers the advantage of
closed-form solutions, it is limited to particular types of reforms. Moreover, it imposes strict
constraints on the modeling of labor supply, which in that study is characterized through two
elasticities. Building on this, Eissa et al. (2008) quantify the redistributive trade-off for actual past
reforms in the US. Again, labor supply is calibrated through extensive and intensive labor supply
elasticities. In contrast, in this paper we build a structural labor supply model, which allows for
non-constant, heterogeneous labor supply elasticities. The reforms are carefully calibrated to be
budget neutral, taking into account their effects on labor supply. We then directly measure the
cost of redistribution of the reforms by comparing the mechanical changes in disposable income
for winners and losers. Finally, we apply distributional weights to the gains and losses in order to
capture the degree of inequality aversion of the social planner.
The hypothetical reforms analyzed in this study are motivated by features of the tax-transfer
systems of other countries that aim at improving labor supply incentives of low income earners.
The Earned Income Tax Credit in the US is a prominent example for a policy which aims at making
3This idea is linked to the concept of the marginal cost of public funds, which measures the decrease in dispos-
able income of tax payers necessary to increase government revenue by one Euro (see, e.g., Ballard and Fullerton
1992). Kleven and Kreiner (2006) provide a recent treatment that considers both extensive and intensive labor supply
reactions.
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work pay for low-income families. The program served as a role-model for several European
countries, which introduced tax credits or subsidies for social security contributions (SSC, see
Bargain et al. 2010). However, the specific designs of the programs vary strongly.4 In Germany,
there is a tax and social-security exemption on jobs with a low level of earnings, so-called marginal
employment. It has been subject to several empirical evaluations (see, e.g., Steiner and Wrohlich
2005), which show that the labor supply of secondary earners is depressed by the potentially high
marginal tax rates imposed by this regulation. The policy reforms analyzed in this study replace
the exemption for marginal employment with a basic allowance for SSC on an individual level.
In contrast to the status quo, this allowance does not entail high marginal tax rates for individuals
earning slightly above the threshold for marginal employment. The two reforms differ in the
ways in which budget neutrality is achieved. In case of the first reform (Withdrawal), the implicit
marginal tax of rate recipients of means-tested transfers is increased to 100%. In case of the
second reform (Taxation), taxes for higher income earners and the upper social security threshold
are increased. These two types of reforms are of particular interest regarding the constrained labor
supply model. In case of the first reform financial incentives to work very few hours are reduced—
if extended part-time arrangements are rationed, people might stop working altogether instead of
opting for full-time. In this case labor market rationing would limit the potential labor supply
increases due to the reform. In case of the second reform people with high productivity are likely
to want to reduce working hours. This effect could be limited through rationing, which would
reduce the potential tax revenue loss at the higher end of the income distribution.
The next section gives a descriptive overview of actual and desired hours of work and describes
the model of constrained labor supply. Section 3 explains how we measure the cost of redistribu-
tion via policy reforms. Section 4 presents the two hypothetical reforms that we simulate as an
illustration of the model. Section 5 presents simulated reform effects and Section 6 concludes.
4For instance, the Working Tax Credit in the UK entailed a minimum hours condition that varies depending on
the household composition.5 In Belgium, the Bonus a` l’Emploi (Employment Bonus) focuses exclusively on persons
with low earnings capacity by referring to full-time equivalent earnings rather than actual earnings and increases in
the working hours of the subsidized employee (see Dagsvik et al. 2011). France recently expanded the size and target
group of its in-work program Prime d’activite´.
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2 The Constrained Labor Supply Model
2.1 Actual and Desired Working Hours in the SOEP
This study is based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an annual representative
survey of German households with more than 20,000 observations per year, see Wagner et al.
(2007). We use survey data from 2015, which contain retrospective information for the year 2014.
The sample is restricted to households with at least one person that can in principle adjust hours of
work (but might be constrained from doing so). Thus we exclude pensioners, mothers on maternity
leave, soldiers, apprentices, and disabled people who work in sheltered workshops. Moreover, the
self-employed are excluded because of the difficulty of measuring their hourly wage.6 Reform
effects are calculated for this sample only. The wording of the question in the SOEP that identifies
desired hours of work is ”If you could choose your own working hours, taking into account that
your income would change according to the number of hours: How many hours would you want
to work?” Thus the answer can be interpreted as the result of utility maximization under a budget
constraint. Tables 1 and 2 display the joint distribution of desired and actual weekly working
hours of females and males, respectively. In the spirit of our labor supply model, continuous
hours of work are summarized in discrete hours categories. The categories included represent
the peaks in the distributions of reported hours. For each individual and working time measure
we assign an hours category based on the minimum distance of reported hours from those hours
categories.7 The main diagonal contains individuals that are satisfied with their current hours
of work. In general, women are more likely to be dissatisfied with their working time. About
45% of all females would like to increase or decrease working hours, with underemployment and
overemployment equally relevant. Men are less likely to be underemployed. For men in couple
households, underemployment becomes even less relevant. Contrarily, single men are relatively
often found to be involuntarily unemployed (not reported). In general, non-coincidence of desired
and actual hours is more relevant at the extremes of the distribution. Three out of four men working
50 hours would prefer to work less.
6For instance, income from self-employment might result from work in the previous year.
7The zero hours category is only assigned to individuals reporting less than one hour of weekly working time.
Individuals whose desired hours are not observed due to item non-response are assigned their actual hours category.
In a robustness test we exclude households with item non-response, see Appendix B. For the unemployed, we only
observe whether they are looking for a part-time job, a full-time job, or whether they are indifferent between those two.
For unemployed singles, we assign randomly one of the part-time (<30 hours) or full-time (≥ 30 hours) categories,
with probability weights given by the observed shares for employed people.
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Table 1: Distribution of desired and actual weekly working hours of women (in percent)
Desired hours
0 10 20 30 40 45 Total
Actual hours
0 6.4 2.1 4.7 1.1 1.0 0.0 15.4
10 0.0 6.3 3.0 0.9 0.6 0.0 10.6
20 0.0 1.3 11.0 2.8 1.4 0.1 16.7
30 0.0 0.3 3.5 12.2 2.7 0.2 18.8
40 0.0 0.0 0.8 11.2 18.0 0.9 30.9
45 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.2 4.1 1.1 7.6
Total 6.4 10.1 23.2 30.4 27.7 2.3 100.0
Notes: Numbers weighted by the SOEP weighting factors.
Source: Own calculation based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016).
Table 2: Distribution of desired and actual weekly working hours of men (in percent)
Desired hours
0 20 40 50 Total
Actual hours
0 2.1 0.8 3.6 0.6 7.1
20 0.0 2.8 1.8 0.1 4.6
40 0.0 6.2 64.9 2.6 73.7
50 0.0 0.6 10.5 3.6 14.7
Total 2.1 10.3 80.7 6.9 100.0
Notes: Numbers weighted by the SOEP weighting factors.
Source: Own calculation based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016).
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2.2 Discrete-choice labor supply
The conventional labor supply model uses information on actual hours of work and households’
budget constraints to estimate utility functions. These are used to predict changes in probabilities
for different employment outcomes of households, when their budget constraints change.
Households’ budget constraints under the status quo and hypothetical reform scenarios are
calculated using the microsimulation model STSM, see Steiner et al. (2012). In addition to the
income tax formula and transfers it accounts for deductions, allowances, social security payments
and child benefits as well as the interactions of the different components of the tax and transfer
system on the household level. See Jessen et al. (2017b) for budget constraints for a wide range of
household types.
For constrained labor supply, labor supply reactions to reforms are obtained in three steps.
First, the probability that households are constrained for specific hours categories are estimated.
Second, households’ utility functions are estimated using information on desired hours of work.
Third, the probability that a household changes its labor supply is calculated using its utility func-
tion and constraint probabilities.
The specification of the structural household labor supply model follows van Soest (1995).
Households are assumed to jointly maximize utility, which depends on hours worked and con-
sumption. Given their hourly wage and the tax and transfer system, agents make a discrete choice
of weekly working hours. The discretization of working hours into j alternatives allows for the
precise calculation of net incomes associated with labor supply decisions using the STSM and does
not impose any restrictions on the form of the budget set, such as convexity. This is a major ad-
vantage relative to continuous labor supply models. The approach accounts for joint labor supply
decisions of couples in a consistent way.
Working hours per week of single women and women with ”inflexible” partners that cannot
adjust their hours of work are discretized into 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 45 and those of single men
and men with partners that cannot adjust their hours of work into 0, 20, 40, and 50 hours.8 As
the procedure to calculate employment outcome probabilities in the constrained model becomes
computationally very burdensome for a high number of hours choices, see Subsection 2.3, couple
households are restricted to combinations of 0, 20 and 40 hours leading to nine alternatives.
Gross labor income is given by the product of working hours and the hourly wage. Potential
hourly wages of the unemployed are predicted using a selectivity-corrected Mincer-style wage
8To assign working hours categories we again follow the minimum distance approach described above (Subsection
2.1).
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regression, where selection is accounted for by the two-step Heckman (1979) approach with binary
variables for young children in the household, marital status, non-labor income, and indicators for
health as exclusion restriction.9
Let L f denote leisure of the female partner, Lm leisure of the male partner, C consumption,
and ε a random disturbance. We suppress individual subscripts in the following. The utility of a
household given a choice alternative z is given by
Vz =U(L fz,Lmz,Cz)+ εz. (1)
The deterministic part of the utility function is given by the translog utility function
U = β1ln(Cz)+β2ln(Cz)2 +β3ln(L fz)+β4ln(L fz)2 +β5ln(Lmz)
+β6ln(Lmz)2 +β7ln(Cz)ln(L fz)+β8ln(Cz)ln(Lmz)+β9ln(L fz)ln(Lmz). (2)
Heterogeneity between households is incorporated through observed household characteristics
that affect some of the coefficients of the utility function:
























X1, X2 and X3 contain individual and household characteristics like age, disability indicators, a
dummy for whether the observed person is a German citizen, and number and age of children (see
Table C.1 for the exact specification of the utility function).
The error terms εz are assumed to be independently and identically distributed across hour cat-
egories and households according to the Extreme-Value type I (EVI) distribution. The probability
that alternative z is preferred by a household is then given by a conditional logit model (McFadden
1974):
Pzd = Pr(Vz >Vj,∀ j 6= z) =
exp(Uz)
∑Jj=1 exp(U j)
,z ∈ J. (4)
9An alternative strategy would be to estimate potential wages jointly with the preference parameters. However,
we do not follow this approach because the small sample properties of the coefficient estimates might be better with-
out joint estimation and chances of misspecification increase under joint estimation. Additionally, the approach would
necessitate an approximation of the budget constraint instead of an exact computation of net income for every house-
hold.
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Alternative z is chosen if it implies a higher utility than any other alternative. The subscript d
denotes desired hours of work. See Table C.1 in the appendix for estimation results.
Changes in net income associated with specific hours points lead to changes in the choice prob-
abilities given by equation (4). For the conventional labor supply model, actual instead of desired
hours are used for the estimation. Then the equivalent of equation (4) can be used directly to calcu-
late aggregate labor supply effects of the hypothetical reforms by comparing choice probabilities
conditional on the budget set under the status quo and under a reform scenario. For the constrained
labor supply model, the estimated utility functions need to be combined with information on the
availability of work hours categories.
2.3 State Probabilities under Constraints
In the conventional model, using actual working hours equation (4) gives the probability that a
household supplies a specific number of hours. In this sense, observed working hours are treated
as revealed preferences. This approach would be valid if there were no constraints in the choice of
working hours. In contrast, in the model with hours constraints, the same equation estimated using
desired hours of work gives the probability that a household prefers a specific number of hours.
Constraint probabilities — For all hours categories z, we separately estimate the probability that
an individual is unconstrained, ψz, using a logit model on all individuals that prefer category z
or prefer another category but choose z due to constraints. Only those who actually work in this
category are unconstrained. For instance, if an individual prefers to work 20 hours, but works 40
hours, he is constrained for 20 hours, but not for 40 hours, and thus contributes to the estimation of
constraint probabilities for both hours categories. Estimations are carried out separately for women
and men using desired and actual hours information pooled over the years 2011–2015. Using
these estimates, constraint probabilities are predicted for all individuals for all hours categories.
Explanatory variables contain the supply-side factors that also enter the hourly wage equation like
education, experience, and disability, as well as a proxy for the state of the regional labor market,
and dummies for firm size and occupation. The rationale for the inclusion of the latter two variables
is that in some occupations working full-time may be the norm, e.g. due to efficiency gains and
fixed cost of work, while in other occupations this is not the case. Additionally the possibility to
work full-time or part-time may depend on the size of the employing firm. For example, it might
be easier for larger firms to adjust to changes of work hours by a single employee. On the other
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hand, there might be social norms prevalent in larger firms that prevent employees from working
part time. Of course, employees are not bound to specific firms and could be offered a better suited
job by another employer. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the search cost exceeds the expected
utility gain from changing the workplace due to the limited number of suitable employers.10
State probabilities — We derive analytical solutions for the household state probabilities using
estimates for the probability that individuals are constrained in given hours categories. In contrast
to standard models of involuntary unemployment, constraint probabilities are allowed to differ
between positive hours categories and between individuals. The derived state probabilities respect
joint utility maximization of couples and are therefore fully consistent with the structural labor
supply model.
Denote by ψz the probability that a household can choose labor supply category z, i.e. that it is
unconstrained for this choice. Let subscripts a and d denote actual and desired hours respectively.
We start with the case of two potentially constrained positive hours categories z and j. The hours
category 0, unemployment, is always available. The state probability Pza for a given hours category











i.e., by the probability that the household is unconstrained for this alternative times the proba-
bility that it prefers category z or chooses it as a fallback option because the preferred alternative
j is unavailable. The first term in brackets gives the probability that category z is preferred. The
second term gives the probability that category j is preferred, but unavailable, times the proba-
bility that the household prefers working in category z instead of not working, category 0. The
probability that a specific hours category is preferred is obtained from equation (4).
Now consider the case of three positive hours categories. Denote by CS the three elements
set of positive hours choices in the household’s choice set.11 Now the probability of employment
outcome z ∈CS is
10For Germany, Knaus and Otterbach (2019) document that job movers are not much more likely to resolve hours
mismatch than non-job movers. This points to a limited importance of job changes as a means to hours adjustments.





















Again, the first term in brackets is the probability that the household prefers alternative z. The
remaining terms give the probability that a different category j is preferred, but unavailable and



























The general formula for a finite number of potentially constrained alternatives forming choice

































The first line of (7) is equivalent to equation (6), except that it contains a sum over k ∈ CS \









denotes the probability that alternative y ∈CS \ {z, j, ...,x} is preferred from the remaining labor






is unavailable (1−ψy), so the household chooses category z. The equation contains (|CS| − 1)!
summations, in practice limiting the number of possibly constrained alternatives for computational
reasons.
The state probability for hours category 0, which is always unconstrained, is given simply by
unity minus the sum of state probabilities for positive hours alternatives,




2.4 Labor Supply Elasticities
Table 3 shows uncompensated labor supply elasticities for the different labor supply models. They
are estimated by increasing hourly gross wages by one percent and comparing simulated labor sup-
ply before and after this wage increase. The elasticities capture adjustments at both intensive and
extensive margins. The first two columns show elasticities obtained using the conventional model
based on revealed preferences alone as is common in the literature. Females’ elasticities are gen-
erally larger than males’ which is in line with most findings in the literature (see Blundell and
Macurdy 1999; Keane 2011). Columns 3 and 4 are based on the same simple model but using de-
sired hours without taking labor market constraints into account. In other words, individuals are
treated as if they worked in their desired hours category. The implied elasticities are substantially
smaller than those based on actual hours worked.12 The last two columns show elasticities based
on the model of constrained labor supply using information on desired hours as well as constraint
probabilities. While smaller than those of the conventional model, the labor supply elasticities of
the constrained model for females are—perhaps surprisingly—larger than those based on prefer-
ences alone (Pure Incentive). The reason is the important role of overemployment. For example,
an individual might want to increase hours of work from 20 to 30 hours because of a wage in-
crease. If a job with 30 hours is not available, she might settle for one with 40 hours of work
instead. This leads to larger labor supply elasticities than without constraints. In contrast, for sin-
gle males the labor supply elasticity shrinks further in the constrained model, pointing to the larger
role of involuntary unemployment.
Table 4 shows intensive own wage labor supply elasticities. The pattern is very similar to that
of total own wage elasticities displayed in Table 3. This indicates that the total elasticities are to a
substantial degree driven by intensive elasticities. Table 5 displays own-wage participation semi-
elasticities for the same household types. Again, the pattern is similar to the one of total hours
elasticities. The largest participation elasticities are estimated using the conventional model, while
the pure incentive model tends to yield the smallest elasticities.
12This is in line with Bargain et al. (2010) who also find that elasticities based on desired hours are smaller than
those based on actual hours. They ascribe this to a “participation bias”, which results from unduly allowing the
(involuntary) unemployed to switch to participation in the model using actual hours. Participation elasticities shown
in Table 5 confirm the importance of the “participation bias”.
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Table 3: Uncompensated Own-Wage Hours Elasticities
Conventional Pure incentive Constrained
Household type female male female male female male
Relative change in total hours worked
Flexible couples 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03
Couples w. flexible female 0.17 0.07 0.09
Couples w. flexible male 0.06 0.00 0.00
Female singles 0.17 0.02 0.03
Male singles 0.20 0.03 0.02




W , simulated with a 1-% wage increase.
Table 4: Uncompensated Own-Wage Intensive Hours Elasticities
Conventional Pure incentive Constrained
Household type female male female male female male
Relative change in total hours worked
Flexible couples 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Couples w. flexible female 0.11 0.06 0.06
Couples w. flexible male 0.05 0.00 0.00
Female singles 0.12 0.02 0.02
Male singles 0.14 0.03 0.01




W |H>0, simulated with a 1-% wage increase.
Table 5: Own-Wage Participation Semi-Elasticities
Conventional Pure incentive Constrained
Household type female male female male female male
Absolute change in the participation rate
Flexible couples 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
Couples w. flexible female 0.05 0.02 0.03
Couples w. flexible male 0.01 0.00 0.00
Female singles 0.04 0.00 0.01
Male singles 0.06 0.00 0.00
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified version of the STSM.
∆part. rate/∆WW , simulated with a 1-% wage increase.
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3 Measuring the Cost of Redistribution via Policy Reforms
As in Immervoll et al. (2007), we measure the cost of redistribution via each of the revenue neutral
reforms as the ratio of mechanical income losses and income gains.13 This measure indicates
by how much disposable income of losers of the reform needs to decrease in order to increase
disposable income of reform winners. In contrast to that paper, we allow for a fully flexible labor
supply model, which allows for income effects as well as non-constant, heterogeneous extensive
and intensive labor supply reactions, and therefore do not obtain closed form expressions. Rather,
we first calibrate the reforms to be budgetary neutral after labor supply reactions and in a second
step we calculate the cost of redistribution. The measure is given by the ratio of the sum of





where L denotes the overall mechanical decrease in disposable income of losers of the reform
prior to labor supply reactions and G denotes the overall mechanical increase for reform winners.
For small reforms this term measures the unweighted ratio of money metric utility changes of losers
and winners.14 In our case, G and L can be interpreted as approximations of the money metric
utility changes.15 In the case of Pareto improving reforms without losers the cost of redistribution
equals zero. In contrast, the more the government has to tax away from the losers in order to
redistribute one Euro to reform winners, the higher is Θ. To fix ideas, consider the simple case
where labor supply reactions overall do not impact government revenue, e.g., if labor supply is
fixed. In this case the cost of redistribution equals one. In contrast, values higher than one indicate
that labor supply reactions lead to a decrease in government revenue.
Now we link the cost of redistribution to equity concerns. A reform is desirable if the following
condition holds:
13Immervoll et al. (2007) use a model without income effects and therefore the cost of redistribution can directly be
linked to efficiency losses as labor supply reactions to a tax increase fully account for the deadweight loss of taxation.
This interpretation is not possible with more general utility functions that allow for income effects—as is the case for
the translog utility function used in this study. See Dahlby (1998) for a discussion of income effects in the context of
the marginal cost of public funds.
14In this case the envelope theorem can be applied and welfare effects due to behavioral adjustments are negligible.
Note that the envelope theorem can be applied as long as reforms do not change the hours restrictions, which we
assume to be the case.
15An alternative approach would be to calculate the equivalent variation or compensating variation by simulation as
in McFadden (1999), Herriges and Kling (1999), and Creedy et al. (2011) or analytically as in Dagsvik and Karlstro¨m







where W indicates the set of winners, si indicates the share of individual i of the total gain
or loss, respectively, and wi are marginal social welfare weights, which indicate the value for the







The left hand side denotes the ratio of the sum of marginal welfare weights of winners and
losers weighted by the share of each individual’s gain or loss in total gains or losses. It is an
indicator of the change in equity achieved by the reform. Usually, individuals with lower income
are assumed to have higher social welfare weights. Thus, the more gains are concentrated on
low income individuals, the larger is this term. The right hand side simply denotes the ratio of
total losses to gains and is a measure of how the reform affects the ”size of the cake”, the cost of
redistribution introduced above. For instance, if there are no labor supply adjustments (Θ = 1),
a reform is desirable as long as the social planner values an additional Euro of consumption for
the winners more than an additional Euro of consumption for the losers. If Θ equals the ratio
of the weighted sums of marginal social welfare weights of the groups of winners and losers,
the respective policy reform does not impose a change to social welfare and the social planner is
indifferent whether to implement the reform.
4 Two Policy Reforms for Germany
We analyze two hypothetical reform scenarios for Germany. Both reforms redistribute to the (full-
time) working poor by introducing a basic allowance to social security contributions. To provide
insights into the impact of both upward and downward constraints on labor supply adjustment,
the reforms differ in the way budget neutrality is achieved. The first reform (Withdrawal) makes
working low hours unattractive by increasing the effective marginal tax rate for transfer recipients
to 100%, which allows to analyze constraints to positive responses at the intensive margin. The
second reform (Taxation) increases marginal income tax rates, which might induce individuals to
16The right hand side divided through the left hand side of equation (10) equals the ”distributionally weighted cost
of redistribution”, which is closely related to the social marginal cost of public funds in Dahlby (1998) and Kleven
and Kreiner (2006).
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work less, and therefore sheds light on potential downward constraints. The current legislation and
the two reforms are described in detail in Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint under the status quo and the two reform scenarios of a
stylized single without children who is eligible for welfare benefits at low levels of labor income.
The figure depicts how monthly disposable income varies with monthly gross labor income for
earnings up to 3,500 Euro (Subfigure (a)) and higher earnings between 3,500 and 7,000 Euro
(Subfigure (b)). Under the status quo, the household is eligible for welfare benefits up to a monthly
labor income of about 1600 Euro. Under the Withdrawal scenario the effective marginal tax rate is
100% due to means testing for low labor incomes above 100 Euro. Thus most working individuals
who receive transfer payments under the status quo are worse off. However, for the depicted
individual the effective marginal tax rate decreases relative to the status quo for labor incomes
above 950 Euro. Under the Taxation scenario, disposable income does not deviate from the status
quo for transfer recipients.
If the individual earns more than about 1,500 Euro per month, he or she is better off under
both reform scenarios relative to the status quo. The maximum financial gain produced by the two
reforms is about 40 Euro per month. Under the Taxation scenario, this gain decreases and turns
negative at earnings of about 4200 Euro due to the increase in marginal tax rates. In contrast, under
the Withdrawal scenario the household is better off even for very high earnings.
Since the effective marginal tax rate under the Withdrawal scenario changes notably only for
low earnings, labor supply reactions can also be expected to be concentrated at low income lev-
els. The full withdrawal of transfers disincentivizes positive working hours at low earnings and
therefore imposes a negative impetus on labor supply at the extensive margin. On the other hand,
working more hours becomes more attractive relative to part-time work.
Under the Taxation scenario, jobs with low to moderate earnings become more attractive com-
pared to very low or medium-to-high earnings. Employees with relatively high earnings are made
worse off compared to the status quo. They face a higher marginal tax rate and a decrease in
net income. The sign of their labor supply reaction thus depends on the importance of income
and substitution effects. Importantly, for both reform scenarios, labor supply reactions depend
on the availability of hours alternatives. In the following, we account for potential labor supply
constraints.
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(a) Labor Income up to 3500 Euro
(b) Labor Income between 3501 and 7000 Euro
Figure 1: Budget Constraint of a Single Household Without Children




Labor supply effects — Table 6 shows simulated labor supply effects of the two reforms obtained
using the constrained labor supply model. Results are displayed by deciles of potential net equiva-
lent income under the status quo regime, i.e., net income if all adults in the household worked full
time adjusted by the modified OECD equivalence scale.17 Using the potential instead of the actual
income decile offers the advantage that the government might be more interested in effects on the
”deserving poor”, i.e., those who would still be poor if they worked full time, instead of effects on
those who have a low income only because they enjoy high amounts of leisure (see Decoster and
Haan 2015). Additionally, results are displayed by household composition.
The Withdrawal reform leads to a small increase in labor supply of women and a small decrease
in labor supply of men in the first decile. Thus for the latter group the effect of the increased
effective marginal tax rate outweighs the positive labor supply incentives brought about by the
SSC basic allowance. In the second to eighth decile, labor supply effects are positive, while they
are virtually zero in the two highest deciles. The effect is strongest for the 3rd to 5th decile
with generally substantially larger effects for females than for males. The effects by household
composition are all positive on average and strongest for single females. The total labor supply
effect is positive, 0.2 percent.
The Taxation reform leads to small increases in labor supply for the lower six deciles, while it
leads to decreases in labor supply for the upper four deciles with the strongest effect for the top ten
percent (-0.2 percent). For households with relatively low income, SSC are more important, while
for higher income households, the tax increases worsen labor supply incentives. Again, female
labor supply reacts stronger to the reform. The analysis by household type shows slight increases
in labor supply for couples with at least two children and decreases for singles. The total labor
supply effect of this reform is very small, but negative.
Table 7 shows participation effects for both reforms. For the Withdrawal reform these effects
are negative in the first two deciles. However, as shown in Table 6, the positive intensive labor
supply response dominates the negative participation effect, leading to a positive overall hours
effect. For some individuals, increased effective marginal tax rates make working unattractive.
However, both the SSC basic allowance as well as the decreased disposable income for working
17Net income divided through one plus 0.5 for every additional adult and 0.3 for every child under 14.
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Table 6: Simulated Labor Supply Effects of the Reform Scenarios Under Constraints
Withdrawal Taxation
Women Men Total Women Men Total
Changes in Hours Worked (in Percent)
By Deciles of Potential Net Equivalent Income
1st 0.2 −0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
2nd 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
3rd 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1
4th 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1
5th 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
6th 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
7th 0.2 0.1 0.2 −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
8th 0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.1 −0.0 −0.1
9th 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
10th −0.0 0.0 −0.0 −0.3 −0.1 −0.2
By Household Type
Couples, 0 Children 0.2 0.1 0.2 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0
Couples, 1 Child 0.3 0.2 0.2 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0
Couples, 2+ Children 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 −0.0 0.0
Singles, 0 Children 0.5 0.1 0.3 −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Singles, 1 Child 0.5 0.1 0.5 −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Singles, 2+ Children 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 −0.0 −0.0
All Households 0.4 0.1 0.2 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified version of
the STSM.
welfare recipients rates make working more hours conditional on working attractive too. The
latter effect dominates. For all other deciles, participation rates increase overall; Participation rates
decrease both for single men and women, with and without children. In contrast, participation
effects are positive for couples. The reason is that secondary earners are not affected by the increase
in the effective marginal tax rate if primary earners have a relatively high labor income.
Across the deciles, the participation rate effects of the Taxation reform are qualitatively similar
to the effects on total labor supply with very small increases in the participation rate for lower
income households and slight decreases for higher-income households.
Overall, the labor supply effects of the two reform proposals are relatively limited—more so
than under the conventional model (not reported). In case of the Withdrawal reform, this is true
especially for participation effects in the two lowest deciles, for which the conventional model pre-
dicts decreases of about one percentage point. At the same time, the conventional model predicts
positive participation effects of 0.2 - 0.4 percentage points for the 4th to 8th decile. The overall
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Table 7: Simulated Participation Effects of the Reform Scenarios Under Constraints
Withdrawal Taxation
Women Men Total Women Men Total
Changes in Participation Rates (in Percentage Points)
By Deciles of Potential Net Equivalent Income
1st −0.2 −0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
2nd −0.1 −0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
3rd 0.0 −0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4th 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
5th 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6th 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
7th 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
8th 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
9th 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.0 0.0
10th 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0
By Household Type
Couples, 0 Children 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Couples, 1 Child 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Couples, 2+ Children 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Singles, 0 Children −0.0 −0.0 −0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singles, 1 Child −0.1 −0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singles, 2+ Children −0.1 −0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.0 0.0
All Households 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified version of
the STSM.
hours effect is substantially larger when applying the conventional model (0.6 percent compared
to 0.2 percent). For the Taxation reform, the negative hours effects for high income earners are
also much more pronounced under the conventional model (e.g. -0.7 percent compared to -0.2
percent for the highest decile). This is also true regarding the positive response found for low to
middle income households. For this reform, this results in an overall effect on labor supply that is
quantitatively similar to that obtained under the constrained model as the larger positive and larger
negative effects cancel each other out.
Distributional effects — Table 8 shows changes in disposable net equivalent income caused by
the two reforms with and without behavioral adjustments. The mechanical and total effect of the
Withdrawal reform in the lower three deciles is a decrease in income. Positive labor supply effects
lead to a smaller decrease after labor supply effects (total effects). The upper sixty percent of
the income distribution gain both before and after labor supply adjustments with the largest post-
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labor supply reaction effect, an increase of 1.4 percent occurring at the 7th decile. The analysis
by household type shows positive mechanical effects for couples with zero or one child and slight
negative mechanical effects for couples with at least two children. Incomes of childless singles
decrease slightly, while lone parents are hit hard and suffer income losses of more than one percent,
even after increasing labor supply.
Table 8: Simulated Distributional Effects of the Reform Scenarios under Constraints
Withdrawal Taxation
Mechanical Total Mechanical Total
Changes in Net Equivalized Income (in Percent)
By Deciles of Potential Net Equivalent Income
1st −4.7 −4.6 0.7 0.7
2nd −4.1 −4.0 0.7 0.8
3rd −2.5 −2.3 1.0 1.1
4th −0.2 0.1 1.2 1.3
5th 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.3
6th 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.7
7th 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.7
8th 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.2
9th 1.0 1.0 −0.5 −0.6
10th 0.7 0.7 −2.4 −2.6
By Household Type
Couples, 0 Children 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.0
Couples, 1 Child 0.2 0.3 −0.0 −0.1
Couples, 2+ Children −0.1 −0.0 −0.2 −0.3
Singles, 0 Children −0.2 −0.0 −0.1 −0.1
Singles, 1 Child −1.8 −1.6 0.3 0.2
Singles, 2+ Children −2.0 −1.8 0.3 0.2
All Households 0.1 0.2 −0.0 −0.1
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified
version of the STSM.
Under the Taxation reform scenario, the lower 80 percent of the income distribution enjoy an
increase in income. The effects of labor supply reactions on income are much more limited in this
scenario. The highest increases in income are enjoyed in the 4th and 5th decile, 1.3 percent. The
ten percent with the highest income suffer substantial net income losses of 2.6 percent after labor
supply adjustments. On average couples with zero or one child and childless singles are nearly
unaffected by the reform, while couples with at least two children lose, and lone parents enjoy
income increases. Individuals on average lose 0.1 percent income under this reform scenario.
Again, the reform effects are moderate compared to those obtained under the conventional model,
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which predicts an overall average income increase of 0.5 percent for the Withdrawal reform and a
0.2 percent decrease for the Taxation reform. However, qualitatively the results remain similar.
5.2 The cost of redistribution
Table 9 shows the cost of redistribution Θ via the two reforms under both the conventional and the
constrained labor supply model. Recall that with no labor supply reaction the cost of redistribution
equals one. Under the constrained model, 91 cents need to be taxed away from the losers of
the reform in order to redistribute one Euro to the winners. The reason is that increases in labor
supply lead to increases in government revenue in this scenario. The cost of redistribution is
even smaller under the conventional model, where only 81 cents have to be taxed away for each
Euro redistributed to the winners. In contrast, the cost of redistribution via the Taxation reform
exceeds one under both labor supply models. Even though the average labor supply effect is close
to zero, as reported above, the fiscal effect of labor supply reactions is negative because higher
income earners reduce labor supply, which leads to a higher loss in tax income than an equivalent
adjustment at the lower end of the distribution. Nonetheless the revenue losses are modest in size.
Correspondingly, the cost of redistribution is close to one. Under the constrained model, only six
cents are lost due to behavioral adjustments for every redistributed Euro. Under the conventional
model the cost of redistribution is predicted to be substantially larger, 15 cents are lost for every
redistributed Euro. The comparison between the two models shows that in our example the cost of
redistribution is closer to one, when taking labor market constraints into account than when they
are ignored.




Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016)
and a modified version of the STSM.
Table 10 shows how mechanical gains and losses of the reforms are distributed over income
deciles. For each decile, it displays the share of winners and losers as well as average gains and
losses. Net incomes of the remaining share are unchanged. Losses of the Withdrawal reform
are concentrated at the lower four deciles, while gains are concentrated on the upper half of the
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Table 10: Gains and Losses under Constraints, by Net Equivalent Income
Withdrawal Taxation
winners losers winners losers
Income decile share ∅ gain share ∅ loss share ∅ gain share ∅ loss
1st 0.23 412 0.65 -1098 0.59 225 0.24 -37
2nd 0.23 423 0.76 -1503 0.61 219 0.31 -27
3rd 0.43 462 0.57 -1714 0.72 315 0.23 -77
4th 0.72 525 0.28 -1853 0.86 462 0.12 -210
5th 0.88 564 0.12 -1453 0.89 538 0.11 -441
6th 0.93 585 0.07 -1233 0.88 539 0.12 -462
7th 0.96 575 0.04 -913 0.80 501 0.20 -622
8th 0.96 595 0.04 -813 0.72 469 0.28 -645
9th 0.98 557 0.02 -777 0.41 387 0.59 -642
10th 0.98 497 0.02 -741 0.06 224 0.94 -1983
all 0.73 543 0.25 -1435 0.65 420 0.32 -890
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified version
of the STSM.
share is the share of households who gain/loose without taking labor supply responses
into account. ∅ gain/loss is the conditional average gain/loss in disposable incomes
per year by group (winners/losers), income decile, and reform scenario.
distribution. Thus, a social planner, who puts a higher weight on low income individuals would
find this reform desirable only if the cost of redistribution was quite small. In contrast, gains of the
taxation reform are more evenly distributed, while the largest losses due to tax increases occur at
the top of the income distribution.18 An inequality averse social planner might thus find the reform
desirable even if it entailed a substantial cost of distribution.
Finally, we calibrate marginal welfare weights for different degrees of inequality aversion and
calculate the left hand side of inequality (11) in order to determine whether the two reforms are












where hhi indicates the number of household members and sci is the modified OECD equivalence
scale. xi denotes the disposable income of the household and γ is a parameter of redistributive taste.
Dividing through the mean normalizes the weights. When γ = 0 there is no inequality aversion, but
social welfare is increased by redistributing to larger households due to the scale effects implied
18In the three lowest deciles, about one fourth of all households loose from the Taxation reform (due to the abolition
of tax exemptions for marginal employment, see Appendix A), however, the average loss is quite small.
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by the equivalence scale.
Figure 2 illustrates the redistributive trade-off of the two reforms. The solid lines indicate
the cost of redistribution via the respective reforms. The dashed lines show the left-hand side of
inequality (11), the weighted change in equity. The figure thus demonstrates the trade-off between
increasing the size of the cake and distributing it evenly. When the dashed line is above the straight
line for the respective reform, inequality (11) holds and the reform is desirable relative to the
status quo. As expected, for relatively low values of inequality aversion the Withdrawal reform is
desirable. The Taxation reform is desirable as soon as the social planner is somewhat inequality
averse.
For values of inequality aversion where both reforms are desirable, the figures cannot be used
to measure which of the two reforms is superior. Therefore, in Figure 3, we calculate the distribu-
tionally weighted average mechanical income change induced by the reforms,




where N indicates the number of households and ∆xi is the income change in Euro of household i.19
Figure 3 measures the total weighted average gain or loss per person. In contrast, the representation
in Figure 2 is normalized and measures the impact of the reforms per redistributed Euro. Figure 3
thus takes the ”size” of the reforms into account, i.e., how much is redistributed. For small values
of redistributive taste the Withdrawal reform is superior to the Taxation reform. For larger values
of inequality aversion, the Taxation reform becomes more desirable, but the weighted average gain
decreases starting from a value of γ of about one. The reason is that households with very low
income benefit from the social security exemption only to a very limited degree. Similarly, with
rising inequality aversion, the absolute value of the weighted average loss due to the Withdrawal
reform decreases. This is because households without market income do not lose from higher
effective marginal tax rates. Table 10 shows that a higher share of households in the second decile
lose than in the first decile and these losses are larger on average.
19Recall that the weight wi contains the number of individuals living in the household and thus translates the income




Figure 2: The Redistributive Trade-off of the Reforms
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM. Dashed lines: left-hand side of inequation (10); straight
lines: right hand side.
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Figure 3: Weighted Average Income Changes
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP and the STSM. Weighted average income changes calculated using
equation (13).
6 Conclusion
This paper makes three key contributions. First, it proposes a theoretically consistent model of
constrained labor supply. Incorporating hours restrictions in a standard discrete-choice household
labor supply model for Germany shows that labor supply elasticities are smaller than the conven-
tional model would suggest. Second, two hypothetical budget neutral reforms aimed at improving
labor supply incentives for the working poor are simulated and evaluated. Third, it proposes a way
to capture the cost of redistribution via reforms of the tax and transfer system in an intuitive mea-
sure. Allowing for detailed microsimulation and a flexible labor supply model, this measure is not
limited to particular types of reforms.
Both reform proposals analyzed in this study include basic allowances for social security con-
tributions. In contrast to tax reductions, reforms of SSC have a substantial impact on the budget
constraints of lower income workers. The first reform is financed by increasing the withdrawal
rates of means tested transfer to 100 percent and the second reform is financed through tax in-
creases for higher income workers. We find that the cost of redistributing one Euro via the first
reform is less than one. This is due to increases in labor supply. This effect is stronger under the
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conventional labor supply model. Using the constrained model, the costs of redistributing one Euro
are still less than one, but larger. The reason is that—in contrast to the conventional model—the
constrained model recognizes involuntary unemployment as such. Therefore efficiency gains of
this reform are smaller. The second reform leads to substantial revenue reductions due to labor
supply reactions under the conventional model, while the losses are more limited, but still relevant,
when imposing labor market constraints. Thus, constraints can also reduce the costs of redistribu-
tion if high income earners cannot reduce their hours of work at will. This shows that using the
constrained model based on desired hours instead of the conventional model makes a difference.
A major drawback of the first type of reform, Withdrawal, is that it decreases disposable in-
come of lone parents, a particularly vulnerable group. In future research, a similar reform could
be simulated that includes elements to explicitly counter this negative side-effect. A second line
of future research would be to explore the causes of labor market constraints and how these con-
straints can be overcome. This extension would be worthwhile in order to achieve a lower cost of
redistribution via reforms of the tax-transfer system.
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Appendix
A The German Tax and Transfer System in the Status Quo and Reform
Scenarios
Table A.1 summarizes the changes to the tax-transfer system brought about by the two hypotheti-
cal reforms. The current German income tax schedule is characterized by a basic allowance, two
”progressive zones” with increasing marginal tax rates, starting with marginal tax rates (MTRs) of
14% and 24% respectively, and two linear zones with marginal tax rates of 42% and 45% respec-
tively.20 The Taxation reform scenario stipulates increases in marginal tax rates by transforming
the tax schedule from currently two progressive and two linear zones into three progressive and
one linear zone. The starting rate of the third zone increases from 42% to 45%. Marginal tax rates
thus begin to increase relative to the status quo already from the lower threshold of the second pro-
gressive zone at 13,469 Euro of yearly taxable income for a single. The top marginal tax rate rises
from 45% due from about 251,000 Euro annual taxable income to 48% due from 70,000 Euro an-
nual income. Finally, the threshold up to which SSC for health and long-term care are due is lifted
to the same upper threshold as for old age insurance in West Germany (5,950 Euro).
The long-term unemployed receive the means-tested transfer Unemployment Benefit II, about
400 Euro per person and month, plus transfers for rent and heating. The first 100 Euro of monthly
labor income are exempted from transfer withdrawal. For earnings above this threshold, in the
status quo the effective marginal tax rate is 80% up to gross monthly incomes of 1,000 Euro, 90%
between 1,001 and 1,200 Euro (1,500 Euro for households with children), and 100% for incomes
above the upper thresholds until transfers are fully withdrawn. For the Withdrawal reform, budget
neutrality is achieved by increasing the marginal transfer withdrawal rate to 100% starting from
earnings of 100 Euro.
Currently, individual earnings up to 450 Euro—so-called Mini jobs—are exempted from in-
come tax and employee’s SSC. In the reform scenarios, the newly introduced SSC allowance re-
places the existing exemption. This change increases the number of individuals that benefit from
SSC exemptions to all employees.21 Due to the non-progressive nature of SSC in Germany, the
20The effective marginal tax rate is slightly higher because of the so-called solidarity surcharge of additional 5.5%
of the tax liability for tax liabilities of at least 972 Euro per year for singles.
21In Germany, SSC are due up to a specified earnings threshold. The SSC reforms are designed such that employees
always benefit from the SSC allowance even if their income lies above this threshold.
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Table A.1: Current System and Changes under Alternative Reform Scenarios
Status Quo (2014) Withdrawal Taxation
Marginal Income Tax Rates (MTRs)
Tax exemption of Mini jobs – –
1st progressive zone: from 8,354 Euro No change No change
2nd progressive zone: from 13,469 Euro No change No change
3rd progressive zone: – – increasing MTR starting with 0.45
from 52,882 Euro
1st linear zone: MTR of 0.42 from 52,882 Euro No Change MTR of 0.49 from 70,000 Euro
2nd linear zone: MTR of 0.45 from 250,731 Euro No Change –
Social Security Contributions (SSC)
Exemption up to 450 Euro/month (Mini jobs) – –
Phase-in of SSC up to 850 Euro/month (Midi jobs) – –
Marginal SSC of 0.20175 from 851 Euro/month from 228 Euro from 228 Euro
up to earnings threshold of 4050 Euro/month
for health and long term care insurance No change 5950 Euro
Allowance: – 227 Euro 227 Euro
Marginal Transfer Withdrawal Rates (MWRs)
Allowance of 100 Euro/month No Change No Change
MWR of 0.8 up to labor income of 1,000 Euro/month MWR of 1 No Change
MWR of 0.9 between 1,001 and 1,200 Euro/month MWR of 1 No Change
(1,500 Euro with children in household)
MWR of 1 afterwards No Change No Change
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level of the SSC reduction is constant for earnings above the SSC allowance. In contrast to in-
come tax reforms, SSC allowances relieve working individuals over almost the entire range of the
income distribution, particularly low to moderate earners who pay little or no income tax. Addi-
tionally, the allowance does not have a regressive effect due to uniform SSC rates. Nonetheless,
the allowance interacts with the income tax and means tested transfers22 such that the net effect on
disposable income varies across individuals.
While the replacement of Mini jobs with an SSC allowance does not impose financial gains or
losses on households receiving means-tested transfers like Unemployment Benefit II, two-earner
couples can suffer considerable income losses in some cases. The current regulation benefits cou-
ple households with secondary earners employed in a Mini job through the tax exemption. Married
couples can opt for joint taxation with income splitting such that, due to progressive taxation, tax
benefits of the Mini job increase in the income level of the primary earner. When the secondary
earner earns slightly more than the Mini job threshold of 450 Euro per month, earnings are fully
taxed. Thus, working slightly more leads to a decrease in disposable household income.
Figure A.1 illustrates how the reforms impact on the budget constraint of an exemplary couple
household—a married couple with two children, with the primary earner’s income held fixed at
4000 Euro per month. The decrease in disposable income at a monthly labor income of 4450 Euro
in Subfigure (a) is due to the Mini job rule.
22SSC are largely deducted from taxable income and deducted from gross income when calculating claims to means-
tested transfers.
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(a) First Earner: 4000 Euro Labor Income, Second Earner: up to 4000 Euro Labor Income
(b) First Earner: 4000 Euro Labor Income, Second Earner: 4001–8000 Euro Labor Income
Figure A.1: Budget Constraint of a Married Couple Household With Two Children
Source: Own calculations based on a modified version of the STSM..
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B Robustness Test
In the main specification we assume that individuals with unit non-response for desired hours are
satisfied with their actual hours of work. As a robustness test we exclude households with at
least one person with unit non-response for desired hours of work and recalculate the estimated
elasticities under constraints. Table B.1 shows that elasticities are almost unchanged.
Table B.1: Uncompensated Own-Wage Hours Elasticities under the Constrained Model
Drop hh with non-response
Household type female male
Relative change in total hours worked
Flexible couples 0.05 0.03
Couples w. flexible female 0.08 .
Couples w. flexible male . 0.00
Female singles . 0.02
Male singles 0.03 .
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016)




W , simulated with a 1-% wage increase.
C Additional Tables
Table C.1: Estimation Results for Labor Supply Model, Dependent Variable: Desired Hours Cate-
gory
Variables Flexible Women with Men with Single Single
Couples Inflexible Inflexible Men Women
Spouse Spouse
Log Net Income −23.69∗∗ −20.26∗∗∗ 0.494 −4.136 −15.12∗∗∗
(8.978) (4.098) (9.700) (5.046) (3.691)
(Log Net Income)2 0.782∗ 0.796∗∗∗ −0.0618 0.253 0.464∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.166) (0.382) (0.165) (0.119)
Log Net Income −0.340 1.424∗ −0.272 1.480∗∗
× German Female (0.546) (0.702) (0.476) (0.561)
Log Leisure Female 90.12∗∗∗ 68.61∗∗∗ 91.24∗∗∗
(6.183) (5.288) (7.675)
Table continued on next page.
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Variables Flexible Women with Men with Single Single
Couples Inflexible Inflexible Men Women
Spouse Spouse
Log Leisure Female 1.720∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗
× Log Net Income (0.328) (0.286) (0.449)
(Log Leisure Female)2 −14.15∗∗∗ −9.942∗∗∗ −13.50∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.451) (0.578)
Log Leisure Female −0.663∗ −0.211 −0.593
× German Female (0.318) (0.383) (0.457)
Log Leisure Female −0.252∗∗ −0.221∗ −0.192
× Age Female (0.0816) (0.0882) (0.0997)
Log Leisure Female 0.00435∗∗∗ 0.00432∗∗∗ 0.00375∗∗
× (Age Female)2 (0.000970) (0.00101) (0.00117)
Log Leisure Female 1.270∗∗ 0.257 1.407∗∗
× Disability I (0.477) (0.555) (0.486)
Log Leisure Female 3.340∗∗ 2.962∗∗ 2.958∗∗
× Disability II (1.042) (1.033) (0.911)
Log Leisure Female 2.758∗∗∗ 2.909∗∗∗ 3.274∗∗∗
× Children under 3 Years (0.254) (0.356) (0.613)
Log Leisure Female 2.088∗∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗ 2.501∗∗∗
× Children 4 to 6 Years (0.211) (0.307) (0.441)
Log Leisure Female 2.196∗∗∗ 1.738∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗
× Children 7 to 16 Years (0.194) (0.272) (0.303)
Log Leisure Female 0.552∗ 0.257 −0.756∗
× Children over 17 Years (0.222) (0.304) (0.353)
Log Net Income 0.317 −0.203 0.807 0.115
× German Male (0.724) (0.373) (0.931) (0.981)
Log Net Income 0.609 0.114 −0.0561
× Log Leisure Male (0.500) (0.598) (0.552)
Log Leisure Male 5.603 123.0∗∗∗ 124.2∗∗∗
(10.35) (9.093) (10.28)
(Log Leisure Male)2 −2.791∗∗ −16.41∗∗∗ −16.43∗∗∗
(0.918) (0.625) (0.816)
Log Leisure Male 0.0219 0.00224 −0.163
× German Male (0.444) (0.560) (0.790)
Table continued on next page.
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Variables Flexible Women with Men with Single Single
Couples Inflexible Inflexible Men Women
Spouse Spouse
Log Leisure Male −0.0712 −0.0623 −0.0298
× Age Male (0.110) (0.113) (0.116)
Log Leisure Male 0.00137 0.00104 0.00115
× (Age Male)2 (0.00122) (0.00130) (0.00136)
Log Leisure Male 2.472∗∗∗ 1.385 1.957∗∗
× Disability I (0.384) (0.727) (0.635)
Log Leisure Male 2.095∗∗ 4.786∗∗∗ 1.446
× Disability II (0.648) (1.053) (0.951)
Log Leisure Male 0.0642
× Log Leisure Female (0.0982)
× German Male
Log Leisure Male 1.332∗
× Log Leisure Female (0.599)
N 35,460 12,234 5,764 3,836 11,754
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v33.1 (2016) and a modified version of the STSM.
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